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STATE -MANAGED DEVELOPMENT:
A LEGAL CRITIQUE
by
James C.N. Paul
Clarence J. Dias
State-managed programs to bring essential resources and other
benefits to rural people are creatures of law as well as political economy
and ideology. Different kinds of law can be used to organize administra-
tion and direct it toward prescribed objects, to create different kinds of
institutions and to allocate powers and roles to actors within them. Simi-
larly, different bodies of law can be used to prescribe processes for
making decisions which dispose the agency's powers; and other bodies of
law may be used to establish systems of review and regulation in order to
hold actors accountable and to identify measures needed to reform existing
structures.
Analysis of these elements can often reveal how existing regimes of
law create or contribute to pathologies which regularly afflict state-
managed programs -- pathologies which in turn contribute to a political
economy of impoverishment, exploitation and exclusion in rural areas.
Conversely, this analysis may help to show how law may be differently
used in order to promote self-reliant participation and more equitable
allocation of resources, values which are now emphasized by new interna-
tional norms proclaimed over the last decade or so.
The 1979, FAO -sponsored World Conference on Agrarian Reform and
Rural Development adopted this declaration:
Participation of the people in the institutions and
systems which govern their lives is a basic human right
and also essential for realignment of political power in
favour of disadvantaged groups and for social and eco-
nomic development. Rural development strategies can
realize their full potential only through the motivation,
active involvement and organization at the grass-roots
level of rural people with special emphasis on the least
advantaged strata, in conceptualizing and designing
policies and programmes and in creating administra-
tive, social and economic institutions including cooper-
ative and other voluntary forms of organization for
implementing and evaluating them. 1
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Other World Conferences, addressing other sectors of development--
habitat, health and employment -- have adopted similar resolutions. 2 But
converting these international norms into practice will require changes in
legal structures as well as changes in power structures. Here we attempt
to analyze some tasks of legal change by critiquing ways in which law is
presently used to structure state-managed rural development, and by
suggesting ways to make these frameworks more responsive to the values
of alternative development.
I. A Critique of the Legal Regimes of State-Managed Development
Understandably, one finds few general critiques of the amorphous
mass of laws which govern the design and administration of different
sectors of rural development in third world countries. The task seems
forbidding because "rural development" encompasses diverse objectives as
well as different kinds and levels of activity; e.g., macro and micro plan-
ning; regulating people and inspiring them; managing local facilities and
national corporations. Various types of law may be used to structure a
program: organic and subsidiary legislation; manuals and directives; un-
written customs of bureaucracies which assume the status of law through
usage; general principles of public law drawn from the constitution, inter-
national commitments and court -made doctrines of administrative law;
legislation of general application such as enactments governing public
employment. It may seem difficult to make meaningful general observa-
tions about the use of these different kinds of legal materials in the struc-
turing of the variegated activities which comprise "rural development."
Nevertheless, some general hypotheses are offered here.
Despite new international norms calling for self-reliant participation,
state-managed rural development continues to reflect continuities from
colonial law and administration. 3 Law is still used to monopolize state
control over most of those resources and activities which make develop-
ment possible for the rural poor. The processes of designing programs
are dominated by experts and technocrats, and characterized by ex parte
decision making. Management and supervision of programs is e'rcs-
by hierarchies of officials whose outlook is professional and elitist--tenden-
cies which are reinforced by rules governing recruitment, tenure and ad -
vancement in public employment. These officials often enjoy broad discre-
tionary powers which are seldom regulated closely by law; conversely,
ordinary people are seldom endowed with rights enabling them to influence
official decisions. Similarly, there exist few accessible institutions with
adequate powers to provide independent review and regulation of the oper-
ations of rural development agencies--particularly their impact on the
poor and disadvantaged. The absence of review contributes to continuing
failures to make changes within programs in order to make them more
responsive to local needs or grievances. Cumulatively, these pathologies
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in law legitimize practices which lead to underallocation of essential
resources to the rural poor; to their continued political exclusion from
sectors where participation is most important, if it is valued at all; to
discouragement or repression of new, popular, self-reliant economic or
political initiatives.
Of course these propositions must be tested by reference to particular
cases--and modified as the complexities of this subject are better under-
stood. They are set out here because they appear to characterize so many
case studies, including those in this volume, and because they indicate that
neglect of the jurisprudence of rural development is a serious omission. A
framework for developing legal critiques of particular programs is sug-
gested below, along with some further observations. The focus is on the
way law is used (and not used) to prescribe general legal principles govern-
ing the:
1. design and enactment of programs, i. e., the processes of
planning programs and promulgating rules to enable them
to go forward;
2. characteristics of institutions to carry out programs;
3. selection and control of actors who exercise important
powers allocated to institutions;
4. articulation of powers delegated to institutions and actors;
5. prescription of processes followed to exercise these
powers; and
6. establishment of structures for review of those decisions
and for securing accountability of actors and institutions
and reform of programs.
1. Design and enactment. Our focus here is on legal principles
governing processes which lead to enactment of development programs:
the investigation of needs, planning and drafting organic legislation, and
subsidiary rules or legal commands expressed in other forms. Since
these decisions determine ends and means of programs, and since ends and
means are interdependent, participation at this stage by those whose in-
terests are immediately affected, obviously becomes important.
Of course many different kinds of high-level decisions may affect the
ultimate content of laws prescribing particular programs (e. g., pronounce-
ments of official ideology; macro planning; prioritization). So one obvious
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vehicle for participation is the "political system." But in most countries
the institutions and processes which make up this "system" provide little
opportunity for "bottom-up" influence by the rural poor, particularly in
spheres of government traditionally perceived as having to do with "admin-
istration." The design of programs, as well as implementation, has regu-
larly been assumed to be a matter for planners and other experts, account-
able to political executives.
Parties in "competitive" political systems are usually formed and
dominated by urban elites with access to money and organizational re-
sources. In one-party systems they tend to be parastatal institutions domi-
nated by political executives. In either event they are seldom structured
so as to become vehicles for grass-roots participation in the design or re-
design of development programs. Similarly, one cannot assume that par-
liaments provide vehicles for effective participation. The rural poor, as
a class, are seldom found in legislative chambers. Moreover, parlia-
ments, like courts, are essentially "reactive" institutions; their powers
must be invoked in a systematic, organized way by those groups who would
seek to use them effectively. Like courts they are also complex institu-
tions requiring skill and knowledge, physical and social accessibility,
intermediaries and organizations for effective participation. These capac-
ities are notably lacking in impoverished rural communities. But they
usually can be found in the more dominant classes in society: high-ranking
public officials; larger-scale landowners; entrepreneurs in agribusiness
and other groups with commercial interests in agrarian economies. Strik-
ing indications of the political power of these groups in parliaments can be
seen from a number of case studies of the enactment of land reform legis -
lation.- Of course rural people may enjoy a chance to voice their frustra-
tions in general elections. But elections are dominated by parties, and
they seldom turn on the kinds of issues which concern us here.
In many countries, programs are enacted by executive decree with no
consideration by the legislature, because, under existing constitutional
arrangements or by virtue of the broad terms of existing enabling legisla-
tion, the executive already has the power to make the necessary rules.
Indeed, it is probable that many development programs are undertaken
without much if any initial attention to the need for laws to legitimize offi-
cial actions already initiated. As several reports in this volume suggest,
enabling rules are often regarded as a bothersome detail by planners and
managers who want to get on with their projects. They perceive--or are
told by experts--of developmental needs to be addressed, and thereafter
they persuade political executives to act upon these findings. The identifi-
cation of "problems" and the ends and means of a responsive program are
determinations made within governmental offices without consultation be-
fore the process has moved to the point of initiating action. The experts
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who engage in these tasks are usually employed by and accountable to
agencies which often have vested interests in the definition and solution of
the problems to be resolved--and in maintaining the role of experts. Ex-
amples of this are portrayed in this volume: the imposition of urban land
use controls in Africa; the imposition of regimes of water management in
Sri Lanka and the Philippines; the countrywide imposition of village-based,
state-regulated cooperatives in Niger. All of these programs proceeded
with no meaningful interaction with people whose basic needs for land,
water, credit and other essential resources inevitably were clearly af-
fected by the projects prescribed. Countless other accounts of programs
reflect these syndromes. 5
As shown by the reports in this volume, the exclusion of rural people
from these processes can produce many unfortunate results. Exclusion
tends to reinforce the impulse of agencies to replicate existing approaches
of "administering" to the poor rather than "empowering" them. Exclusion
allows governments to perpetuate those less visible institutions which are
empowered to appropriate surplus from the rural poor: parastatals which
may determine terms of rural-urban trade, agencies which impose levies
on crops. When professionals promulgate programs unilaterally, the out-
come is regularly flawed by failures to relate the institutions and activities
created to the needs and perceptions of people, for example, failures to
relate programs to provide credit and inputs to farming cycles; failures to
create cooperatives which are understood and accepted by those who are
brought into them; failures to create community acceptance--and thus
effective sanctions--to support regulations designed to prevent serious
health hazards. Disengagement of people from the process of making
laws regularly leads to their disengagement from the steps taken to imple-
ment them. 7 A further result may be the continuing estrangement of the
rural poor from their government. 8
The problems of translating the "basic human right" to participate in
design into a bundle of enforceable, legal rights are obviously complex.
In what ways can law be used to provide meaningful "rights" of participa-
tion in the formulation of national plans for different kinds of agrarian pro-
grams, or in negotiations between a ministry and an international agency
(or a TNC) looking towards establishment of an agribusiness or the erec-
tion of a dam? In what ways can affected groups influence redesign of an
existing program concerned with management of water resources, credit
or government lands? Rights to participate may depend, in part, on recog-
nition of a wide variety of legal obligations and entitlements: requirements
that legislative proposals be publicized with opportunities for public dis-
cussion in accessible forums; establishment of public commissions repre-
sentative of the poor to review programs; recognizing the standing of
popular organizations to be heard in ministries and other executive
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agencies where key policies are made; providing rights of access to the
media. 9 These kinds of laws, if taken seriously, may pose threats to
authoritarian regimes and established bureaucracies. Moreover, prom-
ises of participation--legal or otherwise--will do little to help the very
people who are supposed to be empowered unless they enjoy rights to
participate through organizations. The formation of grass -roots' groups
is a first step in this process.
2. Institutions. Our focus here is on control and accountability within
and betweendifferent kinds of organizations which manage programs. The
belief that the state must control these institutions is deeply rooted. In
part this reflects the entrenchment of colonial models. In part it reflects
distrust of the capacities of rural people to control the operations of these
agencies at local levels. Political economy considerations also loom large.
Control of institutions entails control of patronage, agrarian production and
allocative decisions which often carry significant implications to those in
power. Thus it is not surprising that programs which provide resources
directly to rural communities, or which regulate activities of rural pro-
ducers, are usually subject to the control of political executives of the
central government. 10
Programs which are intended to provide services essentially through
human resources -- activities such as health care, education or agricultural
extension--are usually organized through professionalized bureaus within
ministries. Those which provide credit, inputs, and facilities for storage
and marketing of crops may be organized through some combination of a
system of cooperatives licensed and regulated by a bureaucracy and state
corporations managed by professionals employed by the state and account-
able to political executives. 11 Local institutions created to mobilize vil -
lagers and peasants to contribute money or work to build local roads or
other facilities, or to share in other tasks (e. g., village or district "devel-
opment councils" and other similar groups) are organized under laws which
vest powers of direction (and sometimes coercion) in local officials. 12 Law
enforcement agencies are another component in this panoply of state institu-
tions. Their importance is often neglected in development literature. The
police and the courts enforce penal-type regulations promulgated by minis-
terial institutions (e.g., regulations prescribing proper modes and sched-
ules of agricultural production or proscribing environmental or health
hazards); similarly they enforce collection of taxes and other levies. Other
laws (such as the licensing of meetings) may be used to maintain the power
of local officials to control political activities and frustrate mobilization of
the rural poor.
Experience certainly shows that there is no one institutional form
which is necessarily suitable for a particular function. On the contrary,
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new institutional arrangements are attempted with sufficient frequency to
suggest--despite the usual absence of publicity surrounding reorganiza-
tions -- that the problem of institutionalization is both important and quite
difficult to solve. Jurisdictions are frequently transferred from one
ministry to another -- and often enough to new ministries. 13 "Decentrali -
zation" is now frequently prescribed for diverse ends: to bring govern-
ment closer to people and make it more responsive to them; to achieve
greater "efficiencies" and "coordination" in decision making. But, as
reports in this volume show, 14 decentralization by itself does not produce
participation unless there are genuine devolutions of state powers. An
account of Tanzanian experience suggests some of the reasons:
In 1972, government operations were decentralized,
vastly increasing the numbers of civil servants in the
districts and regions. But budgetary and policy control
remained at the center. Civil servants remained em-
ployees of the center, and because they were hired,
fired, transferred, promoted, and paid by the center,
they were, not surprisingly, more responsive to signals
from above than from the villages. There was no one in
the bureaucracy whose job it was to listen to and act as
advocate for villagers, nor was there much, if any, re-
ward in the system for such behavior. 15
The paradigm of state-managed development administration assumes
the necessity of some form of governmental control over institutions which
allocate resources or regulate behavior deemed important for development
purposes. But thoughtful critiques of development administration tell us
that when the state manages a development program, much of the energy
of those charged with implementation is inevitably diverted to maintenance
of the institutions created rather than to innovative initiatives to satisfy
the needs of intended beneficiaries: lacking the incentives of the market,
or the need to satisfy a demanding electorate, maintenance of power be-
comes a dominant if implicit institutional value; release of power in order
to encourage self-reliant community activities is rightly perceived as a
threat. 16 While the social costs of this syndrome are now widely recog-
nized, the creation of alternative, institutions still seems to be a novel,
sometimes heretical, subject.
If rights of participation are valued ways must be found to include
representatives of people who need to be empowered among decision-
making bodies, or, alternatively, to use popular grass-roots organiza-
tions as institutions to administer programs by allocating powers and
resources directly to them- -as in the "inductive" approach to water
management in Gal Oya, or in the model for primary health care
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suggested by Oscar Gish. Of course, devolution of power from state to
non-state institutions creates new, unfamiliar issues--which we discuss in
a later chapter. 17 But if participation is valued there is a need at the out-
set to challenge the pervasive assumption that institutions of rural devel -
opment must be controlled by state actors.
3. Actors. The focus here is on individuals within institutions who
are empowered to make allocative decisions or enforce regulatory powers,
at both macro and micro levels: in what ways do existing bodies of law
prescribe norms of selection, orientation and individual accountability
which reflect values of participation?
Recruitment of these employees is often dependent on satisfaction of
formal educational requirements, particularly recruitment to higher levels
where university degrees are prescribed, thus tending to limit entry to
those able to enjoy these benefits. The resulting stratification within agen-
cies means that higher-level officials are likely to be both unfamiliar with
and socially distant from problems of the field and the people who must
address them. 18 But professionalization is often apparent in rules govern-
ing entry and deployment into "lower" civil service jobs which furnish
important human resources to rural people: e.g., providers of health,
agricultural and police services within rural areas. Their recruitment and
training is governed by rules prescribed by senior professionals within
their institution, and their accountability runs to those persons--extending
vertically to professional superiors rather than horizontally, into commu-
nities which the agency is supposed to serve. 19 Indeed, laws governing
public employment generally insulate officials deemed to be exercising pro-
fessional tasks from personal accountability to the public by creating immu-
nities from civil liability which are not enjoyed by comparable actors in the
private sector. An extension agent who gives plainly negligent advice or
who callously refuses to attend to the ailing cow of a poverty-stricken
family cannot easily be made to pay tort damages. Tax collectors or
policemen who abuse their authority can invoke doctrines of privilege to
persuade judges to dismiss charges against them. 20
Relationships between officials and the rural poor may also be affected
by laws which empower governments to maintain pay scales and "perqs" of
office which--particularly in regard to higher positions--tend to set offi-
cials far apart in social as well as economic terms from the communities
they are supposed to serve, and indeed enable officials to become part of
the affluent power elite within communities. It is a matter of some in-
terest--and importance--that government commissions set up to investi-
gate pathologies in the civil service (commissions made up of professional
public servants) so often recommend salary increases as the solution to
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the problems found. The causes and consequences of this phenomenon
have been examined in several interesting studies. 2 1 All of these factors
may help to maintain long-standing customs, imbued with the sanctity of
law, which endow "public servants" with the kind of social status which
requires respect and deference; they become important considerations in
societies where stratification is already closely related to political power.
Indeed, in examining particular sectors of "rural development," it is
often important to understand the political linkages -- at both local and
higher levels -- between public officials and the more wealthy and powerful
classes or groups who have an interest in the program. While civil serv-
ice laws were historically intended to isolate and protect government em-
ployees from political influence, that premise may need critical review in
third world settings. As noted, eligibility rules for higher office limit
access to those who usually come from more affluent families, or who
aspire to affluence as a result of higher education. Higher public office is
often a means of commanding resources, patronage and other sources of
largesse of great value to large-scale farmers, leaders of cooperatives
and other wealthier people in rural communities. Often, too, the salary
and perqs provided with higher office are enough to enable state actors to
become "progressive" farmers, landlords or investors in agribusiness.
In this way, and through other social connections (such as family linkages),
civil servants become part of the ruling elite, and the regime of law estab-
lishing civil services may reinforce these tendencies by stratifying access
to positions that count and insulating the occupants of such positions.
If participation is valued, legal principles governing state employment
should emphasize the importance of holding actors personally accountable
for harms they inflict through intention or disregard of known standards
governing exercise of discretion. Indeed, as state institutions begin to
work at local levels with community organizations (as in the health care
and water-management systems described in reports in this volume), then
state actors who provide specialized services to community groups should
be treated, in legal terms, as servants of those groups--just as the
Sarilakas and Gal Oya organizers were made responsible to the community
served. Underlying legal principles governing recruitment should empha-
size the continuing need to reach within impoverished communities to find
and train people to staff development programs--something analogous to
"affirmative action" programs favoring recruitment of women or other
historically disadvantaged groups.
4. Powers. Reports in this volume portray the diversity of tasks
delegated to officials at local levels: some are empowered by delegation
to manage and provide physical resources (e.g., land, water) or human
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resources (health care); some are authorized to interpret and enforce regu-
latory rules (e. g., governing use of water or land) or penal legislation pro-
tecting rights of plantation workers or tenants; some are required to license
and supervise cooperatives or other local business organizations. While
these diverse tasks entail exercise of different kinds of judgment, it is often
important, in analyzing different programs, to examine whether and how law
is used to direct different kinds of discretion towards desired objectives.
For example, it is notorious in some countries that the delegations of
some kinds of "regulatory" discretion--e.g., to grant licenses, or register
property or births--carry built-in opportunities for state actors to charge
unprescribed fees for the exercise of discretion or expeditious action.
Other kinds of delegated discretion carry other kinds of inevitable risks.
Officials who allocate scarce resources - -e. g., land -- inevitably have to
choose who will receive and who will be denied. If this discretion is left
unguided, outside pressures will fill the vacuum. The delegatee, in making
up his mind whether an applicant is worthy, is likely to be moved by those
who can gain his attention and present convincing arguments, and this situ-
ation is usually prejudicial to those who lack intermediaries.
While these kinds of foreseeable problems can be addressed by subsid-
iary rules and directives, the prevailing tendency is to delegate powers in
open-ended terms. The myth of the "neutral, " "rational-legal" bureaucrat
continues to guide lawmakers. For various reasons officials in central
offices may be uncertain, ill informed and yet unwilling to develop further
guidelines through collegial decision making with actors in the field. The
tendency is to pass responsibility down without articulating standards of
accountability, while still retaining powers to intervene. Thus, health
officers, extension agents, cooperative inspectors, police and other offi-
cials in the field are essentially left free to determine how general rules or
directions will be applied. But they must still satisfy what they perceive to
be the expectations of their superiors and that can often best be done by
satisfying dominant groups within the local community. 22
These kinds of conclusions are suggested in some of the reports
offered here. They are also nicely documented in a recent, rewarding
legal analysis of the problems of implementing agrarian legislation in India:
Laws are drafted by the legal department... The
responsibility for implementing them is then passed
down without any attempt to explain the rationale of
these laws to the petty officials who can make or mar
them. This was the experience in Akkalkua. This was
also the author's reaction in Davoor and Shahada. The
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officials, even to the level of the tehsildars are inter-
ested in identifying themselves with the traders, manu-
facturers and big farmers. Not surprisingly, they are
not enthusiastic about implementing laws which have an
adverse effect on their friends. 23
Unregulated discretion can be used to legitimize practices which
produce inaction, inertia, or be used to condone decisions which are incon-
sistent with other decisions made in like cases, or to condone practices
which can lead to corruption. However, powers can be delegated in terms
of the ends and means of the kind of development sought--in ways which
create rights for intended beneficiaries as well as privileges for power
wielders. As every lawyer knows, the way powers are articulated directs
attention not only to what powers are bestowed but also for whose benefit
they are to be exercised, and how--with whose participation. In theory,
the way these kinds of goals and norms are set out as legal commands can
affect:
(a) the duty of delegatees to articulate (through
processes requiring a flow of information to, and
consultation with, affected interests) more par-
ticular standards governing the exercise of discre-
tionary powers;
(b) the capacity of intended beneficiaries to invoke law
to demand a more equitable treatment and the en-
titlements (if any) enjoyed by affected people and
groups in allocational decision making;
(c) the criteria by which the "effectiveness" of imple-
mentation of a state program can be measured;
(d) the criteria used to establish a meaningful system
of accountability for administration; and
(e) the articulation of the relationship between polit-
ical -economic aspirations of a program and the
means of realizing them.
These kinds of guides and standards can be systematically developed and
tailored to the needs of specific programs through subsidiary rules and
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directives; and general laws can require that this be done as part of the
administrative process.
5. Process. Procedures governing decision taking can be a powerful
constraint on otherwise unregulated discretion. The process followed to
enact regulatory rules, determine entitlements to resources, organize
cooperatives, compel behavior or impose sanctions can affect outcomes in
many ways--by compelling examination of factual or normative assump-
tions, by providing information and understanding among those affected, by
instilling confidence in and acceptance of decisions taken. In fact the proc-
esses used for decision making are usually left to the discretion of official
actors. The officers of banks may be left free to establish eligibility rules
and phasing of loans without knowledge of facts which may affect how the
rules they establish will impact on different farming communities; the
officers of an agency empowered to set commodity prices may fix rates
without consulting producers who may be demonstrably exploited by the
result; regulations to promote desired farming practices may be imposed
without communucation with affected persons and hence under a misappre-
hension of highly relevant facts. Just as the law frequently fails to specify
terms of access to decision makers, so it is frequently silent when it
comes to prescribing duties to provide information. Yet the importance of
information--and the consequences of lack of it--is a widely reported phe-
nomenon in the literature of rural development. Knowledge of credit pro-
grams, of technologies, of rudimentary health hazards and precaution--
knowledge geared to basic needs--is all too frequently lacking. The
Sarilakas report (among others) suggests another important category:
knowledge of one's legal rights. Where people lack information about the
existence of programs ostensibly created to aid them, the program itself
may fail to achieve its avowed objectives -- in part because law-enforcing
authorities remain ignorant of violations, or are unprepared to press the
matter when there is no pressure to do so. As the 1.978 Indian develop-
ment plan noted, 24 the organized efforts of intended beneficiaries may
often be the only way they can realize benefits they are supposed to enjoy,
and, as the Sarilakas report shows, those efforts can only be forthcoming
when people understand their entitlements.
In theory, general principles of law -- expanding the concepts of
"natural justice" or "due process"--can be developed to require various
forms of informing, and consultation with, those directly affected--and
often adversely--by agency action. The form and scope of opportunities to
be heard may vary--depending on weighing the burdens imposed by consul-
tation on program implementation against the burdens which impending
rules or decisions may impose on individuals and groups. Of course pro-
vision of opportunities to be heard are of little value if the procedures to
pursue these opportunities are complex and time-consuming. As Reginald
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Green points out, procedures are rarely value free: they may provide the
appearance of due process but in fact impose handicaps on the uneducated
and produce other pathologies in administration. From the perspective of
alternative development, due process procedures must be analyzed in terms
of their value to the poor as a means of facilitating participatton.
6. Review and Regulation. Case studies regularly show that state-
managed rural administration generates grievances among intended benefi -
ciaries. Accounts of the deployment of agricultural extension services
show how relatively few "progressive" farmers are able to co-opt and
benefit from this assistance--and the links it provides to government--at
the cost of neglect of the poor. Similarly, the frequent outcome of the
administration of cooperative laws is the creation of structures which are
dominated by local elites and officials and used to control farming behavior
of small holders, and often enough used for self-dealing purposes. Ac-
counts of enforcement of tax and penal laws show how they are frequently
used as instruments of coercion to repress dissidence. The Gal Oya re-
port portrays another difficulty which frequently confronts peasant commu-
nities: the failure of different agencies to coordinate provision of technical
advice, credit and inputs, so that these benefits can be realized at the time
in the farming cycle when they are needed. The Sarilakas report also por-
trays familiar phenomena: the nonenforcement of laws designed to protect
workers, debtors, tenants, women and others historically disadvantaged
from exploitative practices.
The grievances generated by these outcomes may be widely shared,
deeply felt; but they often remain relatively invisible to outside observers,
in part because information on entitlements is withheld and because ex-
plicitly lawful means for seeking review and redress are uncertain and in-
accessible and because other forms of protest are treated as unlawful.
Thus failures to provide accessible structures with adequate power to re-
view and regulate administration reinforces tendencies towards pathologies
already described.
In theory, of course, a variety of opportunities for review can be
made available. Mechanisms for administrative review could be built into
the body of law structuring cooperatives, extension services and so on.
But usually there is an absence of law on this subject. Complainants may
be told to take their grievances to some higher official, or to write a
letter. After a long delay they may be told the matter is under study. No
law compels a prompt, reasoned response. None is forthcoming. 2  Simi-
larly, auditing procedures (e.g., of cooperative transactions) are often
notoriously lax. One reason why this is so is because the poor have no
access to the accounts of state and parastatal bodies--and inadequate re-
sources to review them.26
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The courts may seem (to lawyers at least) to provide another forum.
But of course there are many constraints: ignorance, fear and suspicion of
the function of government courts; lack of access or intermediaries; lack
of "standing" to present a "justiciable" claim, or a "class" action; lack of
jurisdiction; the understandable reluctance or inability of judges to review
discretionary actions; immunities of officials; lack of suitable remedies--
e. g., powers to put agencies under injunctions compelling affirmative
changes in structure or policy. Whether administrative law could or should
be reformed to enable courts to exercise broader roles of review and regu-
lation is a question discussed below. 27 In recognition of some of the diffi-
culties, many governments have created ombudsman agencies to provide
more accessible alternative or supplementary institutions. But, like
courts, these agencies can only review and respond to individual complaints,
not systemic problems; they lack broad remedial powers and "clout" to
compel structural changes in development programs.
From time to time, needs to provide for more adequate review and
regulation are recognized. Allegations of abuse of powers, incompetence,
systemic breakdowns and dissatisfaction with the "bureaucratic style" are
brought forward -- sometimes by frustrated leaders of governments.
Special commissions are appointed (though they rarely are representative
of the victims of the situations exposed) and various remedies proposed--
e.g., creation of ombudsmen offices, codes of ethics, tightening fiscal
controls, "decentralization." Usually, however, these studies define and
approach the problems from the perspectives of etatist paradigms of devel-
opment administration: the need for discipline and rectitude in existing
structures. Seldom is the problem of review and regulation cast in terms
which emphasize opportunities for victims of maladministration and under-
allocation to present demands for systemic and structural changes--to seek
remedies which strike at root causes of dissatisfaction through creation of
alternative structures. Seldom are the people most affected given any real
power in the system of review, Perhaps this is because investigative and
"law reform" commissions are dominated by political executives, techno-
crats and eminent lawyers who are 1 latively insensitive to the problems
and perspectives of the rural poor.
In the absence of other alternatives, the political system may offer the
most likely avenue of protest. But, as we have already seen, there are
constraints: the rural poor lack resources, organization and intermedi-
aries to press their demands on government, and local administration in
rural areas is usually quite hostile to sui generis attempts of people to
mobilize and take collective action to press grievances, outside of the
activities permitted within parties. Nevertheless, in view of the absence
of other avenues, and in view of the need for basic structural changes, it
seems clear that mobilization, organization and collective action are
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essential. For it is doubtful that systemic changes, entailing redistribu-
tion of power can--or will--be forthcoming solely as a result of reforms
developed from within governments.
IL. Changing the Legal Regime of State-Managed Development
There is now widespread disillusionment with prevailing forms of
state-managed development. "Participation" and "accountability" have
become conventional prescriptions, and the questions more often debated
relate to the meaning and importance to be ascribed to these objectives and
to ways of accommodating them with perceived needs for professional and
state controls. Two approaches are contrasted here.
The "reformist" approach is so labeled because the purpose is not so
much to challenge the basic premises of state management as it is to make
official institutions more responsive to human needs' goals and more
accountable to rule of law norms. A variety of reforms have been at-
tempted or discussed; it is not possible to catalogue them here, but a sum-
mary of three kinds of reformist approaches may illustrate some recent
tendencies and problems.
One set of reforms focuses on the redesign of institutions (to secure
decentralization, autonomy, consolidation of functions and collaborative
participation) and the reorientation of actors (to promote consultation).
One model for this is a district agricultural development agency--a cor-
porate-type institution--which would possess a number of "integrated"
powers (e. g., planning, provision of services and inputs, marketing and
transport) to produce a package of benefits. 29 The institution might be
controlled by a directorate (which might include local representation), or
it might be supervised solely by a manager who would in turn deal with
each of the relevant ministries and other central organs providing re-
sources to the field. Devolution would include block grants and broad
authority over all functions allocated to the agency. Local participation
-- in planning as well as administration--might be secured through (state
created) village or ward development committees. Field staff would be
retrained to learn techniques of participation.
Devolution may indeed bring control over resources nearer to the
rural poor, but it does not, per se, bring it within their grasp; nor does
it alter existing stratifications of power within communities. Nor, expe-
rience suggests, does it necessarily alter other administrative practices
leading to underallocation or corrupt dealings with the disadvantaged.
Many district development corporations in Tanzania appear to have been
mismanaged, and pressure to produce revenues coupled with power of
monopolization have led to programs of little value, indeed sometimes
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harmful, to the interests of the poor. Several papers in this volume go
further in suggesting why devolution, by itself, does not meet the needs of
marginal cultivators, tenants and other agricultural workers for self-
reliance and empowerment. 3 1
Another set of reforms looks towards imposition of tighter discipline
over government actors. These include promulgation of codes of conduct,
new procedures for establishing criminal liability for abuse of power or
corruption coupled with more draconian sanctions, and establishment of
new ombudsman institutions for investigating grievances. Thus local offi-
cials may be prohibited from engaging in private conduct which creates
vested interests in existing forms of rural administration or in existing
social structure: landlording, moneylending or employment of farm labor
may be proscribed. Officials may be charged with broadly-defined crimes
of corruption where their manifest affluence clearly exceeds their salary;
the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant to prove the source of his
wealth.
Again, these measures, by themselves, seem neither to have changed
power relations nor cured many pathologies which help to maintain pov-
erty. 32 Ombudsman institutions may indeed provide some measure of re-
lief for some kinds of grievances--if (and it is often a big if) these agen-
cies are visible, readily accessible, independent and relatively efficient in
handling their jurisdiction. But as already noted these institutions are re-
active rather than proactive. Their jurisdiction does not enable them to
strike at the root causes of recurrent problems nor to redesign inefficient
programs. 3 3
Another reformist approach centers around active use of administra-
tive law (as that subject is traditionally understood by lawyers). A num-
ber of recent decisions by the Indian Supreme Court may illustrate some
of the possibilities open to lawyers, working in behalf of the rural poor,
to use the courts to challenge aspects of rural administration.
In one case 3 4 the court granted "standing" to employees who alleged
that the impending sale of various plants of a government corporation not
only violated their constitutional rights, but that the procedures followed
violated various other provisions of law designed to secure rectitude in
these kinds of transactions. The court held that all of these contentions
could be raised by the petitioners (and proceeded -to examine the merits of
various alleged defects in the sale proceedings). In allowing the peti-
tioners to secure judicial scrutiny of both the "decision to sell and the sale
proceedings," in sweeping aside the "standing" objections of the Attorney
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General, the court declared that it would take a "broader view" of standing
to challenge the corporate decisions. These enterprises are "owned by the
people and those who run them are accountable to the people." Parliamen-
tary control was found to be too "diffuse and ineffective" to preclude the
need for judicial review in order to provide some forum to secure the in-
terests of accountability. The terms on which standing was granted here
are broad enough to encompass other affected groups -- such as consumers
who may be disadvantaged by a corporate decision, or farmers disadvan-
taged by eligibility rules. By implication this doctrine might allow courts
to review many realms of rural administration affecting people particu-
larly dependent on an agency for goods or services. The concurring
opinion of Justices Iyer and Bhagwati noted that the court's "fascinating
[doctrine of] expansionism is of strategic importance viewed in the per-
spective of Third World jurisprudence." They went on to justify "expan-
sion" in terms of the "social audit function" of courts and the need for
"participative public justice. "35
This liberalization of access to the courts has been combined with
liberalization of the scope of review in several cases. In one of consider-
able interest the court applied doctrines of promissory estoppel to the
dealings between a private company and a ministry. 36 Claims of immunity
based on notions of the need for official discretion in awarding benefits and
the need for protection from harassment were all swept aside. Again the
court recognized that it was dealing with rules of "considerable impor-
tance" to "public law," with doctrines capable of "vast possibilities of
growth."
In a third case the court held that a licensing agency was bound by its
published eligibility rules and could not change them "arbitrarily." 37
Again a wide scope for judicial review was quite consciously opened. The
court depicted government as a vast enterprise dispensing new forms of
"largesse" -- services, licenses and other benefits. The argument that
these dispensations are "privileges" not "rights" was swept aside. The
crucial point was that "discretion" to dispense "large e" must always be
governed by norms and these can never be arbitrary, and the courts are
open to determine "arbitrariness," and where a transaction appears prima
facie to reflect favoritism or special treatment the burden appears to shift
to the government to justify its legality.
It is of course uncertain whether judges in other countries can be
persuaded to follow this new "access jurisprudence" geared to an avowedly
"activist" judicial review of programs of resource allocation. Moreover,
there are significant limitations on the capacity of courts--even "activist"
ones -- to reform the legal frameworks of administration. Principles may
appear to be won--but little may happen as a result. 9 People must be
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mobilized (and helped by support groups) to use new legal rules, and the
judicial process cannot by itself produce these resources.
Indeed nearly all of the reforms which address the pathologies of
state-managed development administration depend in the first instance on
the existence of self-managed organizations of the rural poor. Only
through organization (and support from other groups) can they hope to
secure: participation in the processes of design, access to and account-
ability from local officials, proper audits of public bodies, invocation of
the remedial powers of the courts, access to the legislature or to investi-
gative commissions.
The "Alternative" Approach is so labeled because the premise of state
control is directly challenged. The contention is that state monopolization
of power over institutions which plan and manage development programs--
monopolization of the power to make law governing their creation and man-
agement -- regularly leads to the kinds of pathologies and biases portrayed
in the case studies reported here and in so many other accounts of rural
administration. Even more important, the premise of state monopolization
is an inherent contradiction of the values which make people-centered de-
velopment meaningful. Accordingly, the first task is to help people to
form their own organizations, and to help these groups play a much more
pervasive, dynamic role in the design and administration of development.
Another step is to bring the processes of design and lawmaking back to the
communities affected. Another step is to use "non-state" structures to
carry on activities which people can carry on themselves through organi -
zations of their own design. As some papers in this volume show, it is
indeed possible to organize local health care programs through participa-
tory institutions created by and accountable to the community itself.
Water resource programs can be managed, at least for many crucial
purposes, by groups created and governed by those who depend on the
water for their livelihood.40 Group enterprises can be created by people
themselves, using "law" developed by adapting traditions and norms of
community cooperation to new circumstances. 4 1 Of course specially-
trained human resources are needed by rural people to make some kinds
of "development" possible--health care providers, extension agents,
persons versed with rudimentary knowledge of accounting and others. But
it does not follow that these specialists must be provided through struc-
tures which make them only accountable to state bureaucracies rather than
those who most need their services. Reports in this volume show how
health workers, organizers and other personnel can be provided directly
to participatory, community groups which manage these services, and the
employment relationship can be restructured to provide for accountability
to the community. 42 This change of control over institutions and actors
can lead directly to processes for determining powers and guidelines for
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making allocational or regulatory decisions which are participatory, and
hence better understood and usually more acceptable. Further, these
arrangements provide more meaningful opportunities for presentation of
grievances; and a greater likelihood of review and regulation which will be
geared to community needs.
Strategies and methods to develop "non-state" structures and enable
them to take over tasks of administration which the community itself can
handle are discussed in the concluding chapter. It should be apparent,
however, that there is not always a clear line between "reformist" and
"alternative" approaches towards change. The mobilization of rural
groups can be reinforced by efforts to impose a human-needs -oriented
"rule of law" on rural administration, or to create new locally-managed
institutions for agricultural development. Both approaches call for the
creation of new kinds of social resources -- including legal resources--
which communities must enjoy if capacities for mobilization and organi-
zation are to be developed. That subject, too, is deferred to our final
chapter.
Most of the papers in this volume are reports analyzing experiences of
particular programs or sectors of development. Those which follow (in
this section) are descriptions and critiques of state-managed programs;
others (in the next section) contrast state-managed programs with "non-
state," "people-managed" "alternatives." Cumulatively, the papers depict
efforts to organize a wide range of development activities: urban land use
controls, redistribution and "consolidation" of land holdings, cooperatives,
indigenous businesses, water resources, health care. Thus, there is,
here, an interesting body of source materials to develop critiques of con-
ventional approaches to development administration.
Several papers depict tendencies which typify the processes of design-
ing and enacting state programs. For example, the historical phenomenon
of imposing new structures, unilaterally on rural communities--of creat-
ing intervening state institutions which monopolize control of access to
resources--is illustrated in Coldham's account of the imposition of land
tribunals in Kenya and Munkner's account of the imposision of state-regu-
lated cooperatives in the Ivory Coast and Niger. The power of elites to
shape land reforms )of a socialist government) is treated in Samaraweera's
analysis of the design of programs in Sri Lanka in the '70s. The role of
experts (notably expatriates) in designing programs is portrayed vividly in
the reports of McAuslan (on the imposition of urban planning and land use
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controls in several African countries) and Uphoff (on attempts to impose a
hierarchy of state-prescribed,water-management committees on the rice
farmers served by the large Gal Oya irrigation project in Sri Lanka).
Gish discusses the consequences of "top down," ex parte planning of local
health care programs by medical experts of internjationa- and national
health agencies.
Characteristics of state institutions which manage development
programs, and of actors in them--their autonomy, lack of accountability,
antipathy to participation and their links to other powerful groups and
classes--are brought out in a number of papers. Ghai describes the evolu-
tion of new centers of bureaucratic power following a "decentralization"
scheme in Papua New Guinea which was supposed to bring government
closer to people. Anderson discusses governmental manipulation of com-
munity development institutions in the Philippines, and the alliances be-
tween local officialdoms and the affluent in rural communities. Uphoff
describes the autocratic characteristics of the Irrigation Department of
the Ministry of Agriculture which administered the Gal Oya project, and
the effects of this "style" on "equity" and "efficiency" in water allocation.
Gish discusses the tendencies of ministries of health to reproduce highly
professionalized modes of delivering services which preclude or discour-
age community participation both in the work of health care, and in plan-
ning and managing local programs.
The problems of articulating delegations of discretionary powers are
interestingly developed in McAuslan's discussion of the difficulties of en-
couraging building regulations which would encourage rather than frustrate
innovative construction of housing for the urban poor in African settings.
Similar problems are suggested in Ghai's discussion of powers delegated
to a bureaucracy in Papua New Guinea which was charged with the task of
licensing "indigenous business groups," thereby bestowing valuable priv-
ileges of legal personality on these groups. The tendency to delegate
powers in terms which create new realms of authority for state actors
rather than new rights for intended beneficiaries is discussed in Uphoff's
description of draft legislation mandating formation of water-user groups
in Gal Oya.
Several of the papers discuss the absence of meaningful structures for
review and regulation, and the implications of this omission for people who
are dependent upon public and private actors who control resources. The
lack of access of the Sarilakas sugar workers to courts left them at the
mercy of employers who flagrantly abused statutory obligations designed
to protect worker interests in the employment relationship. McAuslan
describes the impotence of the urban poor when it comes to contesting
plainly ultra vires actions of planning bodies -- and the social costs of that
situation.
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As McAuslan suggests, traditional administrative law reforms--e.g.,
attempts to provide access and opportunities for affected people to be
heard -- are, by themselves, unlikely to cure many pathologies. As the
Sarilakas group argues, Basic Human Needs strategies of development call
for basic changes in power relations affecting the design, administration
and regulation of programs. These changes call for new concepts--and
rights -- of participation. Strategies to purse those objectives are
addressed in the concluding section of this volume.
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